Rethinking  Embryo Disposition upon Divorce by Flannery, Michael T.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 29 Issue 2 Article 6 
2013 
"Rethinking" Embryo Disposition upon Divorce 
Michael T. Flannery 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Michael T. Flannery, "Rethinking" Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 233 
(2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol29/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
"RETHINKING" EMBRYO DISPOSITION UPON
DIVORCE
Michael T. Flannery
INTRODUCTION
Because reproductive technology affords married couples the ability to
preserve potential human life for future existence, courts are often forced to
confront the disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce. This problem
arises either because couples fail to expressly state their intent for
disposition upon divorce through contract, or public policy renders such
contracts unenforceable. Consequently, courts are forced to construct
alternative resolutions.
Since 1992, when the Tennessee Supreme Court first confronted the issue
in Davis v. Davis,I courts have applied three different methods of analysis in
2disposing of frozen embryos upon divorce: a contractual approach; a
contemporaneous mutual consent approach;3 and a balancing approach.4
Complicating the various approaches is the additional debate over the status
of the embryos,5 but this is largely a question of legislative policy, the
constitutionality of which is beyond the scope of this Article. Within the
common law framework, all courts, beginning with Davis, have adopted the
standard that embryos are neither property nor persons, but rather "occupy
an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law.
' Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
2 See Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); In re Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261 (Wash. 2002); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2006); In re Marriage of
Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
4 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; J.B. v. M.B. & C.C., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Reber
v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
5 The question of status entails the view of the embryo as either property, "person," or
of an interim category warranting special respect. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
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potential for human life."6 The main question, however, has been: by what
framework of analysis should courts apply this standard?
Many view the approaches taken by the courts as seemingly conflicted
and inconsistent, viewing the variety of analytical frameworks to be almost
mutually exclusive as a matter of policy.7  But in fact, with very slight
exception regarding the right of a progenitor to change his or her mind as to
disposition, all of the cases are actually quite consistent in their analysis for
disposing of embryos upon divorce.
The most obvious consistency among the courts addressing this issue is
the universal call for legislative input on the policies affecting the status of
the embryo, and the specific policies that affect the disposition of embryos
upon divorce.8  Ultimately, these policies involve the consideration of
conflicted constitutional rights of individual parties, which may be premised
upon individual state policies that are beyond the scope of this Article.
6 Id. at 597.
7 See, e.g., Helen S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One's Mind,
12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 75, 103 (2002) (describing American cases as "seemingly
unanimous in outcome [but], in fact, contradictory" and in disagreement about the
enforceability of consent forms, "whether to impose a fixed rule that a person will not be
forced to become a parent after he or she changes his or her mind about implanting
frozen pre-embryos, or whether to balance the rights of each of the divorced persons,
taking into account their individual circumstances."); Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep
Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through
the Adversarial Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 400 (2005-2006) (asserting that "the
adversarial model is a particularly ineffective form of dispute resolution for embryo
disputes," noting specifically the "divergent interpretations of the legal status of the
embryo and the progenitors' interests," concluding that the adversarial model "removes
the decision making authority from the progenitors" and, instead, recommending an
alternative dispute resolution model). But see Elizabeth E. Swire Falker, The Disposition
of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why Embryo Adoption Is An Inapposite Model for
Application to Third-Party Assisted Reproduction, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 489, 493
(2008-2009) (recognizing disputes over cryopreserved embryos arising during divorce
proceedings as "not consistently resolved among U.S. courts" but sufficient, helpful, and
predictive in resolving such disputes); Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procreational
Autonomy Through the Utilization of Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation
Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals An Indefinite Solution, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1365
(2008) (not necessarily critiquing the legal framework itself, but limiting, by default,
dispositions from which parties would choose within the existing framework).
8 See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595; AZ. v. B.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1058.
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These are relevant, however, as any policies implemented by the state may
ultimately affect disposition.9
Whatever the policies of an individual state may be, the legal framework
within which these policies are implemented is sufficient to protect the
interests at stake, provided that the parameters of each framework are more
clearly defined, specifically with respect to the right of a progenitor to
change his or her mind regarding disposition. This is not to say that
legislative input on any number of aspects of the disposition of frozen
embryos is not warranted. Indeed, this Article proposes that state
legislatures should mandate that any couples participating in fertility
procedures involving frozen embryos must expressly provide for their intent
for disposition upon divorce. Such mandates will maximize the opportunity
for individuals to exercise informed, autonomous decision-making authority
regarding disposition. Where parties fail to exercise that authority, courts
will balance the parties' interests to determine disposition. With respect to a
party's right to change his or her mind, within more narrowly defined
parameters, the existing legal frameworks are suited to accommodate that
right, and a legislative mandate requiring expressed intent upon divorce does
not interfere with that right.
In Part I, I discuss the appropriate scope of the three legal frameworks and
how courts should employ them in resolving the disposition of frozen
embryos upon divorce. Courts should not view the common law
development on this issue as a collection of mutually exclusive frameworks
from which to choose, thereby pigeonholing all future analysis of the rights
of progenitors into one analytical framework. Rather, courts should view all
three approaches as a continuum-the application of which is highly fact
sensitive, the most important fact being the unambiguously expressed intent
of the parties for disposition upon divorce. A statutory provision that
requires parties to state their intent supports the policy that such personal
decisions should be left to the individual, and it does not interfere with the
right to change one's mind.
I discuss in Part II the availability of such a mandate and other limitations
upon disposition that state legislatures have implemented. Although much
9 For example, if a state legislature adopts a policy that affords personhood status to
frozen embryos, see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (2012), such status naturally
limits the dispositional options and the enforceability of contracts that require the
destruction of the embryos. However, when conflict arises in such cases, courts must still
determine the appropriate disposition upon divorce, and the frameworks that have been
used by the courts discussed in this Article are sufficient to make this determination
consistently and without contradiction.
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of the legislative posturing on these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article, certain legislative policies on disposition may affect the
enforceability of contracts providing for disposition upon divorce.
Therefore, such policies are relevant to the legal framework that determines
disposition in those cases.
In Part III, I recommend that each state legislature statutorily provide for
its policies on the determinative issues affecting the disposition of embryos
upon divorce. But where they do not, individual courts should more
narrowly define the scope of the analytical framework within which courts
determine the disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce, specifically with
respect to the ability to change one's mind. By doing so, courts will be able
to reconcile individual cases within a reasoned and consistent framework
that affords predictability, eases administrative burden, and reconciles
constitutional interests in a fair and responsible manner.
I. THE DISPOSITION OF GENETIC MATERIAL UPON DIVORCE
In 1992, the first case to address the issue of the disposition of frozen
embryos upon divorce was Davis v. Davis.'0 Davis presented a complex set
of facts that established the comprehensive parameters of the legal
framework within which all subsequent cases would be resolved. I discuss
the factual context of the Davis case in sub-Part C.1 (the "balancing"
approach), infra. In Davis, there was no enforceable agreement for
disposition of the embryos. In determining the appropriate disposition of the
embryos, the court balanced the parties' respective interests based on the
specific facts of the case. In doing so, the court provided a continuum of
reasoning that, when appropriately defined, offers a consistent and workable
common law framework within which to resolve disputes over the
disposition of embryos upon divorce. Specifically, the Davis court held that:
disputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by in
vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the
preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be
ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement
concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior
agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using
or not using the []embryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by
10 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that, in the case of
divorcing parties who each want ownership of pre-embryos, a balancing of each party's
interests should apply).
Embryo Disposition Upon Divorce
means other than use of the []embryos in question. If no other
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using
the []embryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.
However, if the party seeking control of the []embryos intends
merely to donate them to another couple, the ob ecting party
obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.
Based on this holding in Davis, courts have employed three analytical
approaches in addressing the issue: (1) the contractual approach; 2 (2) the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach;' 3 and (3) the balancing
" Id. at 604.
12 Under the pure contract approach, courts are inclined to enforce original agreements
in which the progenitors express their intent for disposition upon divorce. See, e.g., Kass
v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); In re Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash.
2002); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2006); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d
834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). When parties contract but do not express their intent upon the
contingency of divorce, courts could still enforce the agreement to which the parties
consented, but this begs the question of whether two persons who consented to
participate in the In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) process to become pregnant as a married
couple consent to become parents upon their divorce through the subsequent use of their
genetic material, against their will. Under such circumstances, courts could imply the
parties' intent upon divorce or could balance the parties' interests. For comments
favoring the contractual approach, see, e.g., Yehezkel Margalit, To Be Or Not To Be (A
Parent)?-Not Precisely the Question: The Frozen Embryo Dispute, 18 CARDOzo J. L. &
GENDER 355 (2012) (favoring contracts); Marisa G. Zizzi, The Pre-embryo Prenup: A
Proposed Pennsylvania Statute Adopting A Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes
Concerning the Disposition ofFrozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER L. J. 391 (2012) (proposing
requiring agreements and mandating enforcement). But see Deborah L. Forman, Embryo
Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57 (2011) (disfavoring contract agreements).
13 Under the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, agreements between the
parties generally are still enforced, but any such agreement must be contemporaneously
agreed upon; if a party changes his or her mind after executing an initial agreement for a
specific disposition, the court will not enforce the original agreement but will only
enforce a subsequent agreement that is mutually agreed upon. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725
N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780-81
(Iowa 2003); see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (holding that but for the factual
distinctions in the case, the Davis court favored the perspective that the enforceability of
the initial agreement is subject to one party's right to change his or her mind). Absent
subsequent mutual agreement, a court might maintain the status quo until the parties
reach such mutual agreement, or until the term for storage has expired, in which case, the
terms of the contract with the storage facility may dictate disposition, or the court may
determine disposition upon balancing the interests of the parties.
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approach. 14 Within these approaches, courts generally agree that when the
parties state their unambiguous intent with respect to the disposition of
frozen embryos, such agreements will be dispositive. When such stated
intent is not contested by either party, it matters not that the parties' intent is
to destroy, implant, preserve, or donate the embryos.'5 When there is no
agreement, or when the contingency of divorce renders the parties' intent for
disposition ambiguous, courts have balanced the respective rights and
interests of the parties.16 As provided in Davis, in balancing the parties'
interests, ordinarily the party wishing to avoid procreation will prevail,
assuming the objecting party has a reasonable opportunity to otherwise
become a parent.' 7 If no alternative to achieve parenthood exists, then the
14 Under the balancing approach, courts also will enforce agreements in which the
parties express their intent upon divorce. Thus, all courts generally agree that when the
parties state their unambiguous intent with respect to the disposition of frozen embryos
upon divorce, such agreements will be dispositive. But if there is no agreement, if the
parties do not clearly express their intent for disposition, or if there is disagreement, the
court may imply the parties' intent by their participation in the IVF process, or the court
may balance the respective interests. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590-91; J.B. v. M.B. &
C.C., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
There were other approaches, such as an implied consent model, and various equity
models, that the Davis court considered but rejected based on the facts of the case. See
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590-91. However, any of these considerations may be appropriate
within a specific state's policy scheme regarding the disposition of frozen embryos or the
enforceability of contracts involving them.
15 Notwithstanding the party's agreement, the disposition of frozen embryos may be
limited in jurisdictions that hold embryos as having "personhood" status and, therefore,
prohibit destruction of the embryos. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1.2
(West 2002) (prohibiting killing any unborn child, defined as an "individual of the
human species from fertilization until birth"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (2012);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-2691 (West 2003) (providing for various offenses against
unborn children, defined to be "the unborn offspring of a human conceived, but not yet
born"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (Michie 2003) (requiring that embryos be
transferred to a woman to avoid clinical experimentation restrictions); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.04 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting destruction of an unborn child, defined as
a human being from conception until live birth).
" See J.B. v. M.B. & C.C., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
" Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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court may favor the use of the embryos.' 8 Under any of these circumstances,
courts have resolved the issue using the Davis framework. Although
outcomes may vary depending upon the facts of the respective cases and the
policies favored by respective states, courts have consistently applied the
analytical frameworks, which have generally proven workable.
The only issue that courts have not resolved consistently using the Davis
framework has been whether a participating progenitor has a right to change
his or her mind about embryo disposition. This inconsistency, however, is
not necessarily the result of any limitations in the frameworks set out by
Davis, per se. Rather, within the continuum of these frameworks, courts
must more narrowly define the ability of a progenitor to change his or her
mind by identifying and incorporating the intent of the parties specifically
regarding disposition upon divorce. When parties have unambiguously
stated their intent for disposition upon divorce, such agreement should be
enforced. It is only when parties have no original agreement, or they have
an original agreement but have not specifically agreed to disposition upon
divorce, that a party should be able to change his or her mind as a result of
that contingency having occurred. The courts that have applied the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach have blurred the limits of the
Davis holding by allowing parties to alter an original agreement that
included the unambiguously expressed intent for disposition upon divorce.
A more narrowly-drawn distinction that affords a party the right to alter an
original agreement only when the original agreement did not contemplate
the contingency of divorce accords more with the analysis in Davis. Such an
approach provides a fair and consistent legal framework within which to
resolve these cases.
Furthermore, a statutory mandate that requires parties to state their intent
for embryo disposition in the event of divorce provides predictability for
parties and clinics, encourages and promotes informed autonomous
decision-making by the parties-which is favored by courts-and avoids the
burden and expense of unnecessary litigation.
A. The Contractual Approach
Contrary to cases in which parties have no agreement regarding the
disposition of the pre-embryos upon divorce and, consequently, courts are
18 See Reber, 42 A.3d at 1133; see also Bailey Henneberg, Maryland Woman Wins
Custody of Frozen Embryos, GREENBELT PATCH (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://greenbelt.patch.com/articles/judge-awards-maryland-woman-custody-of-frozen-
embryos?national-patch&ncid=edlinkuspatcO0000006 (describing case in which court
gave nine frozen embryos to ex-wife over ex-husband's objection).
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left to resolve the conflict by balancing respective interests, some courts are
faced with the issue of whether to enforce an existing agreement between the
parties and thereby avoid any consideration of individual interests. 19 The
first case in which a court employed a strict contractual approach to the
disposition of frozen embryos was Kass v. Kass, decided five years after
Davis in 1997.20
1. Kass v. Kass
In Kass, Maureen and Steven Kass participated in an IVF process and
produced five remaining frozen embryos. 2  Prior to the procedure, the
parties executed an informed consent document, which provided, in part:
In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any
stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and
will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to
initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the
disposition of our frozen pre-zygotes remaining in storage.22
Regarding the disposition of the embryos, the informed consent agreement
provided:
In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are
unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored,
frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition
of our pre-zygotes and direct [that] . . . [o]ur frozen pre-zygotes
may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and
be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research
investigation as determined by the IVF Program.
19 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Roman v.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2006) (enforcing contract); In re Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261
(Wash. 2002) (enforcing agreement of parties regarding disposition of cryopreserved
embryos after five years); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)
(enforcing parties' agreement by making no determination as to disposition); Kass v.
Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 162-63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (enforcing terms of consent forms,
signed by husband and wife to donate embryos in event of divorce).
20 Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 150.
21 Id. at 153.
22 Id. at 152.
23 id.
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Upon the parties' divorce claim, they executed a divorce agreement which
provided, "[t]he disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is
that they should be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent form
and that neither Maureen Kass[,] Steve Kass or anyone else will lay a
custody claim to these pre-zygotes."24 Subsequently, however, the wife
25
changed her mind and asserted a claim to custody of the frozen embryos.
In light of the Davis analysis, the court in Kass reasoned that "the first ...
inquiry should be directed at whether the parties have made an expression of
mutual intent which governs the disposition of the pre-zygotes under the
circumstances in which the parties find themselves," thus, limiting the
26context of the parties' intent to divorce. Noting the Davis court's
"bemoaning" of the lack of expressed intent in Davis, the Kass court held
that the Davis balancing analysis may be appropriate when parties are in
conflict, but when there is an agreement such balancing is not necessary.27
In considering the wife's argument in Kass, the court found it significant
that the agreement "[did] not mandate any particular disposition of the pre-
zygotes-it merely provide[d] that they will not be released from storage
absent a court order directing same." 28  But the court held that "[t]his
provision relative to divorce did not confer on the court the right to ignore
the unambiguous agreement of the parties as to the disposition of the pre-
zygotes and to de novo create its own disposition based on what it believed
was a more equitable determination. . . ."29 In Kass, the only express
agreement between the parties that spoke to "the circumstances in which the
parties [found] themselves" was the agreement to allow the clinic to use the
embryos for research if they could not otherwise agree. Because the parties
24 Id. at 153.
25 id.
26 Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 156-58. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (ruling "as a
starting point, that an agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preembryos
in the event of contingencies . . . should be presumed valid and should be enforced as
between the progenitors .... Providing that the initial agreements may later be modified
by agreement will, we think, protect the parties against some of the risks they face in this
regard. But, in the absence of such agreed modification, we conclude that their prior
agreements should be considered binding.").
28 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589 (emphasis in original).
29 id.
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could not agree, the court simply enforced that agreement. 30 The court held
that:
the decision to attempt to have children through IVF procedures
and the determination of the fate of cryopreserved pre-zygotes
resulting therefrom are intensely personal and essentially private
matters which are appropriately resolved by the prospective
parents rather than the courts. Accordingly, where the parties have
indicated their mutual intent regarding the disposition of the pre-
zygotes in the event of the occurrence of a contingency, that
decision must be scrupulously honored, and the courts must refrain
from any interference with the parties' expressed wishes.. . . [T]he
parties in this case made such a clear and unequivocal choice, and
the plaintiffs subsequent change of heart cannot be permitted to
unilaterally alter their mutual decision.3 1
Concurring Justice Friedman was concerned that the informed consent
document signed by the parties was insufficient to unambiguously state the
parties' intent. 32 Justice Friedman suggested some ambiguity in the parties'
agreement in that, arguably, the agreement to contribute the embryos to
research was reserved simply for the extra pre-zygotes left over from the IVF
procedure, but that the divorce contingency provided for resolution by the
court upon the parties' disagreement. 33 But even if this were the case, the
court would be left to balance the interests of the parties, as in Davis. Under
this approach, Justice Friedman did not favor the strict balancing test but,
rather, favored the presumption that the interests of the party objecting to use
of the embryos outweighs the interests of the party wishing to procreate.
Therefore, despite this viewpoint, Justice Friedman concurred with the
majority holding.34
3o Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 155.
31 Id. at 162-63 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 163 (Friedman, J., concurring). For a discussion regarding the insufficiency of
consent agreements between progenitor parties and fertility clinics, see Forman, supra
note 12, at 57 (urging courts and legislatures not to enforce embryo disposition divorce
provisions found in clinic consent forms).
3 Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 163-65.
34 Id. at 163. Justice Friedman refers to the dicta in Davis-providing for the court to
favor use of the embryos for a party wishing to implant the embryos if this were her only
means of parenting-and suggests that such a holding conflicts with the holding in
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), which
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Dissenting Justice Miller agreed with concurring Justice Friedman that the
informed consent document signed by the parties did not reflect an
unambiguous agreement to destroy the embryos.35  Justice Friedman
expressed that agreements between parties should be encouraged, if not
mandated:
The legal, emotional, and ethical nightmare resulting demonstrates
the clear need for legislation mandating that in vitro fertilization
clinics require the execution of a standardized, binding agreement
setting forth the parties' specific intentions in the event of
foreseeable changes in circumstances, and possibly for legislation
altering the parent status of the party objecting to parenthood to
that of a s erm donor, thereby avoiding potential child support
obligations.
Absent such agreement, the dissent argued that the court should balance
the respective interests of the parties, as the court did in Davis.3 7
Nevertheless, the majority in Kass adopted the bright line rule that the
parties' original agreement was enforceable and determinative of the
disposition of their frozen embryos because the parties had already
contemplated in the agreement the circumstances in which they found
themselves. The specific language in the majority opinion supports the view
that courts will employ a strict contractual approach only when the parties
have considered the contingency of divorce and have expressly provided for
their unambiguous intent upon the occurrence of that contingency.38
2. Cahill v. Cahill3 9
In Cahill v. Cahill, a husband and wife had three zygotes, formed via IVF
procedures performed during the marriage, that were frozen at the Medical
provided that "no person or entity should be allowed to interfere with another person's
decision not to have offspring before the point of viability." Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 165
(citing Danforth, and Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos,
76 VA. L. REV. 437, 523 (1990)).
3 Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 168.
36 Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 162-63.
3 Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
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School of the University of Michigan ("the University").40 Upon obtaining a
divorce, the divorce judgment did not include an award of the three
zygotes.4' The husband asserted that the parties' contract with the
University prohibited either party from unilaterally obtaining the zygotes
from the University.42  The pertinent provision of the parties' "Contract
Concerning Control and Disposition of Zygotes" provided:
[The wife] and [the husband] agree that all control and direction of
our [zygotes] will be relinquished to the Physicians of the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology under the following
circumstances:
'1. A dissolution of our marriage by court order ....
'4. At any time by our/my election.
'5. If we/I have not remained in contact with the IVF program
for a period of time exceeding three (3) years.43
The trial court ordered that "the zygotes shall not be the property of either
party [and that] [a]ccording to the only evidence presented, the University of
Michigan appears to be the current owner of the zygotes."44 Therefore,
based on the contract accepted by the court, the trial court essentially made
no determination as to the disposition of the zygotes and left the issue of
disposition to be litigated by the parties and the University in future
45 46proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed that determination.
Therefore, as in Kass, notwithstanding any policy considerations by the
State or equitable arguments by the parties regarding their respective rights
and interests, the court enforced the agreement that the parties had executed
40 Id. at 465.
41 id.
42 Id. at 466. The wife was ordered to submit the parties' original contract to the court,
which she failed to do. Absent the original contract, the husband submitted to the court a
standard, unsigned form normally used by the University in its IVF procedures. The
husband claimed that the parties signed and agreed to the terms of a similar form. The
wife did not contest this claim, and the court accepted the form as the basis of the parties'
contract with the University. Id. at 467.
43 Id. at 466.
4 Id. at 467 (emphasis added by Court of Appeals).
45 id.
46 Id. at 468.
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prior to their participation in the procedure since it contemplated divorce and
stated the parties' intent for disposition with respect to it.
3. In re Litowitz"
In In re Litowitz, the court also enforced the parties' agreement regarding
disposition, even when one of the parties-the wife-was not a progenitor of
the eggs that were used and, therefore, was not genetically connected to the
embryos that were the subject of the dispute.48
In Litowitz, Becky and David Litowitz had two cryopreserved embryos,
which were the subject of a parenting plan upon their divorce.49  The
husband had already adopted two of the wife's children from a previous
marriage, and they had a biological child together prior to their marriage.50
Shortly thereafter, the wife underwent a hysterectomy, leaving her unable to
produce eggs or to naturally give birth to a child.5 1 The couple decided to
undergo in vitro fertilization to have another child, and they created five
embryos using eggs obtained from an egg donor, fertilized by the husband's
sperm.52 A female child was born from use of three of the embryos
implanted in a surrogate mother. The two remaining embryos were
cryopreserved." The parties, as the intended parents, signed a contract with
the egg donor, providing that "[i]n no event may the Intended Parents allow
any other party the use of said eggs without express written permission of
the Egg Donor."54 The parties entered into two contracts with the clinic, one
for authorizing embryo cryopreservation (freezing) following in vitro
fertilization, and the other for cryogenic preservation (short term), which the
47 In re Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
48 Id. at 267.
49 Id. at 262.
50 id.
5 Iid.
52 id.
s3 Id. at 262-63.
54 Id. at 263 (emphasis in original).
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court deemed not relevant to the matter.55 Under the cryopreservation
agreement with the clinic, the parties agreed to the following:
By this document, we wish to provide the Center with our mutual
direction regarding disposition of our []embryos upon the
occurrence of any one of the following four (4) events or dates: . .
C. Our []embryos have been maintained in cryopreservation for
five (5) years after the initial date of cryopreservation unless the
Center agrees, at our request, to extend our participation for an
additional period of time....
At the earliest of the above-mentioned events or dates, we
authorize and request that one of the following options be utilized
for the disposition of our []embryos remaining in cryopreservation:
(3) That our []embryos be thawed but not allowed to undergo
further development; .... 56
Unlike the agreements in Kass and Cahill, the agreement made no
mention of specific disposition upon divorce. Rather, the agreement
provided:
We agree that because both the husband and wife are participants
in the cryopreservation program, that any decision regarding the
disposition of our []embryos will be made by mutual consent. In
the event we are unable to reach a mutual decision regarding the
disposition of our []embryos, we must petition to a Court of
competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate
disposition of our []embryos.5 7
Thus, the parties agreed that, upon disagreement, they would seek a court
determination regarding disposition. Because disagreement could have
occurred at any time, this provision was broad enough to cover disagreement
within the marriage or upon the contingency of divorce.
Upon their divorce, the husband wanted to donate the remaining embryos
for adoption. Conversely, the wife wanted to use a surrogate to bring the
embryos to term. The lower court awarded the embryos to the husband
5 Id. The court noted that the latter agreement was not relevant to the issue before it.
Id. at 263, n.20.
56 Id. at 263-64 (emphasis in original).
7Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
Embryo Disposition Upon Divorce
under the "best interest of the child" standard. 59  The appellate court
affirmed, finding that the husband's right not to procreate compelled the
court to award him the embryos, and the wife appealed.60 The Supreme
Court of Washington reversed and enforced the parties' agreement to
petition the court for instructions when they could not reach a mutual
agreement regarding disposition of the embryos.61
Thus, as in Kass and Cahill, even though the contract did not expressly
mention divorce, the scope of the parties' intent expressed in the agreement
included that contingency. Therefore, the court in Litowitz simply enforced
the original intent of the parties, which was that the court would determine
the appropriate disposition upon disagreement. However, the court still had
to make that determination. In doing so, rather than balancing the parties'
constitutional interests, as in Davis, the court again focused on the parties'
intent, providing:
Intent may be discovered not only from actual language in an
agreement, but also from "viewing the contract as a whole, the
subject matter and objective of the contract, all the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract, the subsequent acts and
conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of
respective interpretations advocated by the parties." 62
In light of these considerations, the court simply enforced the disposition
to which the parties had originally agreed, which was that the remaining
embryos be "'thawed out but not allowed to undergo further development'
and disposed of when the embryos 'have been maintained in
cryopreservation for five (5) years after the initial date of cryopreservation . .
,1,63
Note the difficulty presented by the fact that the parties never expressed
their intent for disposition upon divorce. For the court to have relied upon
the provision authorizing thawing, but no further development of the
' Id. at 264, n.28. ("The characterization of frozen prembryos as "children" is of
dubious legal or scientific correctness. However, it is of no consequence to our
determination in this case."); see also id. at 269.
60 Id. at 265.
61 Id. at 268.
62 I
63 Id. at 27 1.
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embryos after a prescribed period of cryopreservation, begs the question
whether the parties did, in fact, mutually intend for the same disposition
upon divorce. Justice Chambers, concurring with the majority opinion,
observed that all of these considerations must be made in the context of a
dissolution proceeding, and principles of equity and public policy must be
factored into the equation.6 Justice Sanders, who dissented in the opinion,
asserted that the only intent expressed by the parties upon disagreement was
to let the court determine the appropriate disposition, and the trial court did
just that, having made a determination based on the "best interest of the
potential child."45
But the majority's disposition apparently calls for the destruction of
unborn human life even when, or if, both contracting parties agreed the
[]embryos should be brought to fruition as a living child reserving their
disagreement over custody for judicial determination. Thus the majority
denies these parties that option left by Solomon in lieu of chopping the baby
in half. The wisdom of Solomon is nowhere to be found here. 66
Accordingly, based on the factors and policies that, arguably, the court
should consider, the dissenting Justice would have disposed of the embryos
by ordering the husband to donate the embryos to a suitable couple. 6 7
However, the majority determined that the parties' intent was for the
embryos to be destroyed after a specific time. This case illustrates the
importance of the parties' intent and the factors a court should consider
when the parties do not unambiguously express their intent for disposition
upon divorce. In Part III, I offer recommendations for addressing and
64Id.
65 Id. at 274 (Sanders, J., dissenting). "I cannot fault a trial court that recognized the
fundamental purpose and objective of the contract and dealt with the prospect a child
would be born, the future of which was of paramount concern and profound
responsibility." Id.
66 id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 271. Here, the provision to let the court decide upon disagreement could have
included disposition upon divorce (unless the parties divorced but still agreed as to
disposition). As it happens, the parties divorced and disagreed, so the court determined
disposition. If legislation were in place that implemented a default presumption or policy
regarding disposition, the decision to let the court decide would have been more
informed. Nevertheless, the court enforced the parties' agreement to allow the court to
decide upon their disagreement.
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resolving these questions. However, notwithstanding the actual disposition
of the embryos and the basis for it, like the court in Kass, with respect to the
framework within which the court must determine disposition, the Litowitz
court simply enforced the original agreement of the parties, which was to
authorize the court to make the appropriate disposition of the embryos.
4. Roman v. Roman69
In Roman v. Roman, the parties had three frozen embryos, which the
lower court awarded to the wife, Augusta N. Roman, over the objection of
the husband, Randy M. Roman, in the couple's final decree of divorce.70
Upon the husband's appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that the
parties may voluntarily decide the disposition of a frozen embryo in advance
of cryopreservation, and that the embryo agreement between the husband
and wife, which provided for embryos to be discarded in the event of
divorce, was valid and enforceable.71
The parties participated in in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation.72
They signed a consent agreement in which they agreed to discard the
73
embryos in the case of divorce. The agreement also allowed them to
withdraw their consent to the disposition of the embryos and to discontinue
their participation in the program.74 On the night before implantation, the
husband expressed feelings that led him to withdraw his consent. A month
later, the parties signed an agreement to unfreeze and implant the embryos,
contingent on receiving counseling, in which they never participated.
Subsequently, the parties filed for divorce and reached a property settlement
agreement, except for the disposition of the frozen embryos.
69 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
70 Id. at 41-42.
n1 Id. at 54-55.
72 Id. at 42.
7 Id.
74 Id.
7 Id. at 42-43.
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The Roman court purposefully drew its holding narrowly, "in anticipation
that the issue would ultimately be resolved by the Texas legislature." 76 The
court acknowledged the parties' agreement classifying the frozen embryos as
their "joint property" and, in doing so, the court commented on the
developing nature of legislation on that issue.77 Absent any such legislative
resolution or policy directive, however, the court was confronted with
determining the appropriate disposition of the embryos and the
enforceability of the parties' prior written agreement. In making these
determinations, the court provided:
We are mindful of the cases that have addressed this issue and
particularly what we see as an emerging majority view that written
embryo agreements between embryo donors and fertility clinics to
which all parties have consented are valid and enforceable so long
as the parties have the opportunity to withdraw their consent to the
terms of the agreement. Because we are not bound by state law
from other jurisdictions, however, we will also review our own
statutes to determine the public policy of this State in the context
of embryo agreements.7 8
In assessing the state's policy, the court looked to the Uniform Parentage
Act for its policy regarding ART and gestational agreements. In reviewing
these bodies of law, the court concluded that "the public policy of [the] State
would permit a husband and wife to enter voluntarily into an agreement,
before implantation, that would provide for an embryo's disposition in the
7 Id. at 44. See also id. at 44, n.6 ("At least three states have enacted legislation
addressing frozen embryos. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17 (couples must execute
written agreement providing for disposition in event of death, divorce or other unforeseen
circumstances); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 168-B:13-168-B:15, 168-B:18 (couples must
undergo medical examinations and counseling; 14-day limit for maintenance of ex utero
pre-zygotes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (pre-zygote considered "juridical
person" that must be implanted); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.102(2) (defining
assisted reproduction), 160.706 (entitled "Effect of Dissolution of Marriage") (Vernon
2002), & 160.754(e) (Vernon Supp.2005) (stating that parties to gestational agreement
must enter into agreement before the 14th day preceding the transfer of embryos).
77 Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 44-45, n.7.
7 1 Id. at 48.
7 Id. at 48-49, n. 11 (referring to Uniform Parentage Act & Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § §
160.001-.763).
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event of a contingency, such as divorce, death, or changed circumstances"80
and that such agreements between parties should be "presumed valid and
should be enforced as between the progenitors."81
With respect to the specific agreement in Roman, the court relied on the
parties' "Informed Consent for Cryopreservation of Embryo," which
provided, in part: "If we are divorced or either of us files for divorce while
any of our frozen embryos are still in the program, we hereby authorize and
direct, jointly and individually, that one of the following actions be taken:
The frozen embryo(s) shall be . . . Discarded." 82 The parties' agreement,
itself, recognized the lack of legislative policy on the matter, wherein the
agreement provided:
We understand that legal principles and requirements regarding
IVF and embryo freezing have not been firmly established. There
is presently no state legislation dealing specifically with these
issues. We have been advised that each embryo resulting from the
fertilization of the wife's oocytes by the husband's sperm shall be
the joint property of both partners based on currently accepted
principles regarding legal ownership of human sperm and oocytes.
We are aware that these regulations may change at any time.83
Nevertheless, the court held that the parties' intent for disposition upon
divorce could not be more clearly stated84 and held that the trial court abused
80 Id. at 49-50.
81 Id. at 50 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)).
82 Id. at 51-52. The court noted that the agreement also gave the parties the option of
releasing the frozen embryos to either party, but that the parties declined this option. See
id. at 51, n.17.
8 Id. at 51.
84 Id. at 52. The dispute between the parties stemmed from the wife's claim that the
agreement was ambiguous as to the application of the provision regarding destruction of
the embryos. The wife claimed that she intended that aspect of the agreement to apply
only to embryos that remained after implantation had occurred, and that she never agreed
to destroy embryos without an opportunity to get pregnant. However, the court did not
interpret the agreement as supportive of this claim. One of the husband's contentions of
dispute was that the trial court erred in awarding the embryos to the wife after he
withdrew his consent to implantation. Id. at 54. However, the court distinguished the
husband's desire to withdraw consent to a specific implantation from a repudiation of the
embryo agreement and withdrawal from the program. Id. at 54, n. 18.
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its discretion by not enforcing the parties' agreement that the embryos be
discarded.
5. In re Dahl and Angle86
In In re Dahl and Angle, the husband and wife produced six
cryopreserved embryos through an IVF procedure, after which the parties
dissolved their marriage. At the time of the IVF procedure, the parties had
signed an embryo storage agreement which provided that if the parties
disagreed as to the transfer and disposition of the embryos, the wife was
solely authorized to transfer and dispose of them, unless a court awarded
either of the parties the exclusive rights to the embryos.88 If the parties
failed to comply with the agreement, they could have authorized the clinic to
donate the embryos to another woman, and the parties would consent to
waive any claims to the embryos. Alternatively, they could authorize the
clinic to donate the embryos to a research facility. The couple selected the
agreement option that allowed them to donate the embryos to a research
facility if they failed to comply with the agreement.89
Upon the parties' divorce, the wife claimed exclusive rights to the
embryos under their agreement.90 The husband denied having read or
initialed the agreement and objected to the destruction of the embryos or
their donation to research; he preferred that the embryos be donated to
8 Id. at 54-55. For focused discussion on the Roman case, see Theresa M. Erickson &
Megan T. Erickson, What Happens to Embryos When A Marriage Dissolves? Embryo
Disposition and Divorce, 35 WM MITCHELL L. REv. 469, 483-87 (2009) (favoring
contractual approach; predicting that United States Supreme Court would favor
contractual approach in such cases).
8 In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
81 Id. at 836.
88 Id. Like the provision in Litowitz, this provision could have covered the
contingency of divorce, but only if the parties divorced and disagreed, which, in fact, is
what occurred.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 837.
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another couple. 91 The trial court enforced the parties' agreement, allowing
the wife to destroy the embryos, and the husband appealed.92
On appeal, the husband argued that his desire for 'his offspring to
develop their full potential as human beings' should outweigh the wife's
interest in avoiding genetic parenthood. "93 The court rejected the
opportunity to balance those interests because the parties had already
reached a contrary agreement. 94  In defaulting to the parties' original
contract, the court noted that:
[h]usband fails to advance, and we cannot identify, any affirmative
countervailing state policy that would impose a genetic parental
relationship on someone as a default principle. Nor does he
identify any affirmative state policy favoring his preferred
disposition of the embryos. . . . Given that, we have no basis on
which to disturb the trial court's conclusion.95
The court suggested that an expressed state policy with default
presumptions or favoring in the balance of progenitor choices may be a
sufficient basis to overturn a decision enforcing the parties' original
91 Id.
92 Id. at 837. The Court of Appeals was not clear if the trial court's decision to destroy
the embryos was based on the trial court's balancing of the constitutional interests of
each party and a determination that wife's constitutional interests outweighed the
husband's, or if it was based on the terms of the agreement signed by the parties. Id. at
837, n.2.
9 Id. at 841.
94 Id. at 842.
9 Id. at 841-42, n.6. The court noted that other states did provide for specific policies
regarding decision-making authority over preembryos. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2006) (requiring IVF providers to obtain informed and
voluntary choice regarding disposition of unused embryos); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
742.17 (West 2005) (requiring IVF agreement and prescribing decision-making authority
absent such an agreement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (2008) (defining a human
embryo as a "juridical person" that must be implanted); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH.
111 L, § 4 (West Supp. 2008) (requiring IVF providers to obtain informed and voluntary
choice regarding disposition of unused embryos); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West
2007) (permitting embryonic research, requiring informed and voluntary choice by
parties regarding disposition")). For further discussion of State policies regarding the
disposition of embryos, see Part 11, infra.
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agreement. Absent a countervailing policy expressed by the legislature,
however, the court gave effect to the parties' original intent.9 6
Thus, in all five of the "contractual approach" cases, notwithstanding the
parties' subsequent disagreement, the courts enforced all of the parties'
original agreements, all of which included provisions sufficient for
expressing the parties' intent for disposition of the embryos upon divorce.
This begs the question, however, of whether the courts would have enforced
the agreements similarly had the agreements not included provisions
expressing the parties' intent upon divorce, or if, for example, like the
provision in Litowitz, regarding disposition upon disagreement, the
agreements were not interpreted to include divorce.
A perspective of mutual exclusion among the three frameworks might
suggest that courts would have enforced such agreements. However, the
language of the court in Kass suggests that they would not, and that a strict
contractual approach would only apply when the parties have contemplated,
and stated their unambiguous intent upon, divorce. It stands to reason that if
a state adopts the premise described in Kass-that the decision to dispose of
embryos resulting from participation in IVF procedures is "intensely
personal" and a "private matter" that is "appropriately resolved by the
prospective parents rather than the courts" 97-and the parties' divorce is
viewed as a contingency that affects that decision, then the court would only
enforce an agreement in which the parties had considered the contingency
and consented to disposition upon it. Had they not considered the
contingency and consented to disposition upon it, enforcing such a contract
would defy the policy that favors the parties making a mutual decision based
on that contingency. Thus, a strict contractual approach could preempt the
mutual intent of the parties when they have not considered and agreed upon
the contingency of divorce. As recognized by the courts that have
confronted this issue, legislative guidance would clarify the state's policy for
the respective courts in this circumstance.
B. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
At least two courts have adopted a less strict approach to the enforcement
of contracts regarding the disposition of frozen embryos by allowing parties
to change their minds from their original agreement upon changed
96 Dahl, 194 P.3d at 842.
97 Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
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circumstances, such as divorce. In accordance with the perspective that a
strict contractual approach might be over-inclusive if the parameters were
not narrowly defined to limit the enforceability of agreements to those in
which the parties contemplated divorce, reason suggests that courts that
adopt a contemporaneous mutual consent approach also would determine
that the parties may only change their minds if they had not already
expressed their intent for disposition upon divorce.
1. A.Z. v. B.Z.
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the parties had four frozen embryos in storage after having
undergone successful IVF procedures that resulted in the birth of twin
daughters.99 During each procedure, the husband had signed a blank
consent form, which the wife subsequently filled-in, providing that, upon
separation-not divorce-the parties consented to allow the embryos to be
implanted in the wife. 00 The consent form also allowed the parties to
change their minds, provided they both notified the clinic in writing.' 0'
Upon the parties' subsequent divorce, the wife wished to use the embryos to
become pregnant, and the husband wished for the embryos to be
destroyed. 102
Acknowledging the history of IVF procedures'0 3 and the law surrounding
their use,' 04 the court considered the reasons supporting the enforcement of
98 See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (finding that a consent form
providing for embryos to be given to wife for implantation upon marriage "separation"
was unenforceable because, inter alia, "separation" is distinguishable from "divorce," so
consent form was ambiguous; see also In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa
2003).
99 Id. at 1053.
'oo Id. at 1053-54.
'0 Id. at 1054.
102 Id. at 1054-55.
103 Id. at 1055, n.13 (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes,
84 MiNN. L. REv. 55 (1999) [hereinafter Coleman]; Jennifer Marigliano Dehmenl, Note,
To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes Over
Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 1377 (1995); Heidi Forster, The
Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack ofLaw in the United
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contracts between progenitors: minimizing misunderstanding, maximizing
procreative liberty, and providing needed certainty to IVF programs.10 5
However, the court refused to enforce the parties' consent agreement for
three reasons. First, the court held that, under the circumstances of the
consent form and the parties' lives, the consent form did not represent the
intent of the parties regarding disposition of the preembryos in the case of a
dispute between them.o Rather, the court viewed the consent form as a
guide to the clinic if the couple (as a unit) did not wish to continue with the
IVF procedure.10 7  Second, the consent form did not contain a duration
provision. Instead, the form was signed four years earlier, before the
occurrence of changed circumstances that the parties did not necessarily
consider, and to which the husband now objected. 08 In this light, the court
held:
In the absence of any evidence that the donors agreed on the time
period during which the consent form was to govern their conduct,
we cannot assume that the donors intended the consent form to
States, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 759 (1998); John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 407 (1990); Donna M. Sheinbach,
Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen Embryos: Will Prior Consent
Documents Survive if Challenged by State Law and/or Constitutional Principles?, 48
CATH U. L. REv. 989 (1999); Daniel I. Steinberg, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational
Rights and Disputes Over the Fate ofFrozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 315 (1998);
Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs-Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating
Decisional Authority Over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 937 (1999).
' The court referenced the three states that, at the time, had legislation regarding
frozen embryos: Florida, New Hampshire, and Louisiana. AZ., 725 N.E.2d at 1055; see
FLA. STAT. ANN § 742.17 (West 1997) (requiring couples to "enter into a written
agreement that provides for the disposition . . . in event of a divorce, the death of a
spouse, divorce or other unforeseen circumstance") (effective June 30, 1993); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:15 (2010) (requiring couples to undergo medical examinations and
counseling and imposing a fourteen-day limit for maintenance of ex utero prezygotes)
(effective Jan. 1, 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121- 9:133 (providing "prezygote
considered 'juridical person' that must be implanted") (enacted 1986).
10 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (Mass. 2000).
106 Id.
1o7 id.
"0s Id. at 1056-57.
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govern the disposition of the frozen []embryos four years after it
was executed, especially in light of the fundamental change in
their relationship (i.e., divorce). 9
Third, the consent form contemplated becoming "separated," which it did
not define.' 0 Unlike the court in Litowitz, which interpreted the scope of
the parties' agreement broadly, the court held that it could not conclude that
this consent form was intended to govern the disposition of embryos upon
divorce.' 1
Thus, unlike all of the courts that applied the "strict contractual approach"
for agreements that expressly provided for disposition upon divorce, the
court held that "[n]o agreement should be enforced in equity when
intervening events have changed the circumstances such that the agreement
which was originally signed did not contemplate the actual situation now
facing the parties."I12 Because the court determined that the parties had not
contemplated divorce, it allowed the husband's subsequent intent to alter the
alleged mutual intent expressed in the parties' original agreement." 3 The
converse implication would be that where the parties' agreement did
contemplate the divorce that they now faced, the court would not allow
either party to change his or her mind and unilaterally alter the original
agreement. However, in the absence of a binding agreement, as in Davis,
the court in AZ. determined that the "best solution" was to balance the
wife's interest in procreation against the husband's interest in avoiding
procreation.1 4  In considering this balance, the court noted that the
'0 Id. at 1057.
11 Id.
111 Id.
11 2 Id. at 1055 (emphasis added).
113 The court noted the questionable circumstances under which the husband signed the
original agreement, wherein the husband simply signed a blank form, on which the wife
later filled in the alleged agreed-upon disposition. Because the court offered several
factors on which it based its decision that the form did not accurately reflect the parties'
mutual agreement, it is not clear how much weight the court placed on these facts in its
determination. See id. at 1056-59.
114 Id. at 1055. The balancing approach of Davis is the applicable framework when
parties have not contemplated the contingency of divorce, thus, it follows that the courts
would likewise balance the parties' interests when one party changes his or her mind
such that disagreement about disposition is the result.
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legislature already favored a policy of not enforcing contracts that compel
family relationships:'1
[T]his court has expressed its hesitancy to become involved in
intimate questions inherent in the marriage relationship. . . .
'Except in cases involving divorce or separation, our law has not
in general undertaken to resolve the many delicate questions
inherent in the marriage relationship. We would not order either a
husband or a wife to do what is necessary to conceive a child or to
prevent conception, any more than we would order either party to
do what is necessary to make the other happy.' 6
Thus, the court would not enforce an agreement that compelled one party
to become a parent against his or her will." 7 It follows, then, that even if the
parties' original agreement included a provision in which the parties
contemplated divorce and expressly stated their intent for disposition upon
divorce-such as the parties in A.Z. did by consenting to one of the parties
using the embryos to become a parent after divorce-then, if one of the
parties subsequently changed his or her mind and objected to such
disposition, the court would not enforce the original contract because it
could compel a family relationship against the will of one of the parties.
The court further noted that allowing one party to change his or her mind
"enhances the 'freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life.""' 9 However, it is not at all clear if such freedom of personal choice
may supersede a previous, but variant, agreement to which the party already
consented. The court in A.Z held:
" Id. at 1058. The court noted that the legislature had already abolished the cause of
action for breach of promise to marry, and allowed a mother four days to change her
mind for adoption, and noted the court's laissez-faire attitude about marriage issues and
reluctance to enforce agreements that bind parties to future family relationships. Id. at
1058-59.
116 Id. at 1058 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Mass.1974)).
'
7 Id. at 1057.
118 Enforcing a contract in which one of the parties uses the embryo to become a parent
raises numerous questions about the resulting parental status of the objecting progenitor.
While such possible outcomes are relevant to the need for state legislatures to statutorily
provide for policies addressing issues involving the disposition of embryos in such
circumstances, the specific outcomes regarding parental status and the resulting rights
and obligations of the parent-child relationship are beyond the scope of this Article.
"' Id. at 1059 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1935 (1977)).
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We derive from existing State laws and judicial precedent a public
policy in this Commonwealth that individuals shall not be
compelled to enter into intimate family relationships, and that the
law shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing such
relationships when they are not desired. This policy is grounded
in the notion that respect for liberty and privacy requires that
individuals be accorded the freedom to decide whether to enter
into a family relationship. . . . "There are 'personal rights of such
delicate and intimate character that direct enforcement of them by
any process of the court should never be attempted."'l
20
Thus, the court ruled that the alleged contract with the fertility clinic
would not control, and if one of the parties wished to avoid procreation after
the divorce, that person's choice would control by presumptive default.'21
The court did not enforce the specific agreement in A.Z. because it held
that the agreement did not accurately reflect the intent of the parties and
because it violated a public policy favoring autonomous decision-making.
However, the court did not hold whether it would necessarily enforce the
agreement if the parties had expressed their intent for disposition upon
divorce.122 Nor did the court hold that it would not enforce a mutual
agreement that provided for donation of the embryos to a surrogate, for
research, or to be destroyed, i.e., where one party is not becoming a parent
against his or her will.123 Thus, even when the court relies on general
policies relevant to issues involving family relationships-specifically,
policies respecting the right of contracting parties to change their minds in
issues involving procreation.124 Courts confronting the disposition of frozen
12 0 Id. (citing Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Mass. 1974)).
121 Id.
122 The court specifically noted, however, that, although it relies on the reasoning of
Davis and Kass, it does not necessarily subscribe to the views expressed by those courts,
thereby suggesting that, even with an express provision for disposition upon divorce, the
agreement may still be subject to one party changing his or her mind. Id. at 1056, n. 19.
123 Id. at 1057-58, n.22. The court also recognizes that "agreements among donors and
IVF clinics are essential to clinic operations. There is no impediment to the enforcement
of such contracts by the clinics or by the donors against the clinics, consistent with the
principles of [its] opinion." Id. at 1058, n.22.
124 See infra, note 211 and accompanying text (discussing policies for changing one's
mind in other reproductive areas).
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embryos upon divorce may require express legislative clarity on the issue.
Absent such legislative clarity, the most reasonable application of
contemporaneous mutual consent that comports with the reasonable
parameters of a strict contractual approach is to enforce original agreements
in which parties express their intent for disposition upon divorce, and to
limit the opportunity of one party to unilaterally alter original agreements to
circumstances under which the original agreement did not contemplate the
contingency of divorce.
2. In re Marriage of Witten l25
As in A.Z, the court in In re Marriage of Witten held that it is against
public policy to enforce a prior agreement regarding the use or disposition of
frozen embryos when one party changes his or her mind.126 In Witten, the
parties employed several unsuccessful IVF procedures during their marriage,
which resulted in seventeen fertilized eggs remaining in storage.127 For each
procedure, the parties had signed informed consent documents that provided
that the embryos would only be transferred, released, or disposed of upon
the signed approval of both parties.128 There was no specific provision
addressing disposition upon divorce.129
125 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
12 at 7 1.
127 Id. at 772.
128 id.
129 The court's perspective on the scope of the parties' original agreement outside the
context of the contingency of divorce presents a notable distinction between this court
and the other courts discussed in this Article. Many other courts conclude that a court
cannot enforce an agreement between the parties regarding disposition of embryos-
whether it be an agreement for destruction, implantation, or donation-when the
agreement does not expressly contemplate and provide for the parties' intent upon
divorce. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B. & C.C.,
783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Reber v. Reiss,
42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Following the logic of these courts, the agreement in
Witten, providing that both parties must mutually consent to the disposition of the
embryos, would be equally unenforceable within the context of the contingency of
divorce. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the agreement between the parties in Witten
contained no such provision regarding divorce, the Witten court enforced the agreement
requiring that both parties must mutually agree to disposition, concluding that the scope
of the parties' agreement regarding "release of embryos" was "broad enough to
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At trial, the wife sought "custody" of the embryos so that she could
implant them in herself or donate them to a surrogate, through which she
would become a genetic parent; she objected to destruction of the embryos
or donation to another couple. 130 The husband did not oppose donation to
another couple, but he opposed destruction or implantation in the wife.1
Under the terms of the parties' agreement, the district court enjoined the
parties from using or disposing of the embryos absent written approval by
the other party. The wife appealed.132 She claimed that because the consent
agreement did not provide for the parties' intent upon divorce, the court
should apply a "best interest" analysis and award custody of the embryos to
her on that basis. Alternatively, she argued that the court should balance her
interests in procreating over the husband's interest in not procreating, and
that it would violate public policy for the court not to enforce an agreement
to which her husband impliedly consented by his participation in the IVF
process.133
In addressing each of the wife's arguments, the court recognized the legal
framework provided by the courts that previously addressed this issue,
which are discussed herein. 134 Regarding the contract approach adopted by
Kass, Litowitz and, to a limited extent, Davis, the court relied on
commentators that find problems with enforcing original contracts.1 The
court concluded that "[t]he contractual approach and the contemporaneous
mutual consent model share an underlying premise: 'decisions about the
disposition of frozen embryos belong to the couple that created the embryo,
encompass the decision-making protocol when the parties are unmarried as well as when
they are married." Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773.
130 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772-73.
' Id. at 773.
132 id.
I33 Id.
134 Id. at 773-74.
135 Id. at 776-77 (citing Coleman, supra note 103, at 55; Christina C. Lawrence,
Procreative Liberty and the Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal
Framework to Settle the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721,
729 (2002)); accord J.B. v. M.B. & C.C., 783 A.2d 707, 718-19 (2001).
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with each partner entitled to an equal say in how the embryos should be
disposed."' 1 36
In favoring a mutual decision by the couple,' 37 proponents of the mutual-
consent approach suggest that, with respect to "decisions about intensely
emotional matters, where people act more on the basis of feeling and instinct
than rational deliberation," it may "be impossible to make a knowing and
intelligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the time the right is to
be exercised." 3 8 The court mitigated this concern, recognizing that, under a
mutual contemporaneous consent approach,
advance instructions would not be treated as binding contracts. If
either partner has a change of mind about disposition decisions
made in advance, that person's current objection would take
precedence over the prior consent. If one of the partners rescinds
an advance disposition decision and the other does not, the mutual
consent principle would not be satisfied and the previously agreed-
upon disposition decision could not be carried out ....
When the couple is unable to agree to any disposition decision, the
most appropriate solution is to keep the embryos where they are-
in frozen storage. Unlike the other possible disposition
decisions-use by one partner, donation to another patient,
donation to research, or destruction-keeping the embryos frozen
is not final and irrevocable. By preserving the status quo, it makes
it possible for the partners to reach an agreement at a later
time."' 39
6 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (citing Coleman, supra note 103, at 81).
137 Id. at 780-81.
138 Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 98); see also Sara D. Petersen,
Dealing With Cryopreserved Embryos Upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at
Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1090 & n.156 (2003) (stating
"surveys of couples that have stored frozen embryos suggest that they may be prone to
changing their minds while their embryos remain frozen" and citing a study that found
'[o]f the 41 couples that had recorded both a pre-treatment and post-treatment decision
about embryo disposition, only 12 (29%) kept the same disposition choice."' (citation
omitted)).
139 Id. at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 110-12); see also Coleman, supra
note 103, at 89 (suggesting "the embryo would remain in frozen storage until the parties
reach a new agreement, the embryo is no longer viable, or storage facilities are no longer
available"); accord Lawrence, supra note 135, at 742.
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Thus, under the contemporaneous mutual consent approach adopted in
Witten, the court provided a broad opportunity for both parties to exercise
decision-making autonomy, while, by default, favoring the interest in not
procreating over the use of the embryos.140 Like the court in AZ., the Witten
court supported its mutual decision-making policy by considering the
policies inherent in other areas involving marital and family relationships,
the effect of which was to treat the parties' divorce as essentially rescinding
the parties' prior agreement by operation of law.14 1  Accordingly, by
140 See Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procreational Autonomy Through the Utilization
of Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals An
Indefinite Solution, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1365, 1366-67 (2008) (arguing for default rule
application that provides progenitors with only three options: (1) donate to other
potential parents; (2) donate to research; or (3) thaw and dispose; such limitation of
options arguably "honors both progenitors' procreative autonomy, is in line with public
policy, and provides certainty in a situation where certainty has never before existed.").
The court suggests that whether parties have a right to change their mind or the interests
of the respective parties are considered, the outcomes are generally the same when the
state's public policy favors the interests of the party wishing to avoid procreation over the
interests of the party wishing to use the embryos. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 (citing A.Z.
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000) ("As a matter of public policy, ...
forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement."); J.B., 783 A.2d at
717 (evaluating relative interests of parties in disposition of embryos, concluding
husband should not be able to use embryos over wife's objection); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) ("Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation
should prevail."); Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the
Solution?, 27 VT. B. J., 29, 31 (2001) ("Some argue that the party seeking to avoid
procreation should prevail, and indeed, this appears to be the one harmonizing rationale
of the four reported cases.").
141 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781, 782 (considering state law requiring seventy-two hour
waiting period after child's birth before parent may relinquish parental rights, limitation
of damages for breach of promise to marry, and prohibition on contracts encouraging
dissolution of marriage). The court notes that contracts between donors and fertility
clinics should still be enforced (as stated in AZ v. BZ) because they serve the purpose of
"defining and governing the relationship between the couple and the medical facility,
enduring that all parties understand their respective rights and obligations." Id. at 782
(citing Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 897, 918 (2000) (noting "courts and most scholarly authorities would
transform documents designed to record the transmission of medical information from
clinic to couple, and the couple's acceptance of medical treatment, into a binding
agreement between the couple itself")). The court acknowledges that "[w]ithin this
context, the medical facility and the donors should be able to rely on the terms of the
parties' contract." Id. (citing A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 n.22 (Mass. 2000)
(noting court's decision not to enforce agreement between partners is not an "impediment
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rejecting the contractual approach and the balancing approach, when one
party changes his or her mind and the parties are not able to reach a mutual
decision regarding the disposition of the embryos, the court held that public
policy required that the status quo be maintained. The practical effect of this
was that the embryos would be stored indefinitely unless both parties
subsequently mutually agreed to disposition.14 2 As it happens, the parties'
original agreement accorded with this public policy. Even if the parties'
original agreement in Witten were otherwise, however, the Witten court held
that public policy favored a party's right to change his or her mind and
disfavored the court's ability to balance the interests of the parties upon any
such disagreement. This begs the question of whether the court would hold
otherwise on the issue of changing one's mind if the parties had expressed a
different intent upon the contingency of divorce, or if the court were not to
interpret the scope of the language of the contingency provision so broadly
to include the contingency of divorce.
Thus, as in A.Z., the framework adopted in Witten was largely dependent
on the state's inconsistent public policy. The difference, however, is that the
holding in Witten highlights the one shortcoming that the framework
provided by Davis affords, which is the lack of defined parameters with
respect to the right to change one's mind. That parameter should be defined
by the parties' unambiguously expressed intent upon the specific
contingency of divorce. Absent specific legislative policy on the disposition
of embryos upon divorce, the application of related policies not intended for
the disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce may undermine the mutual
intent of the parties or result in inconsistent applications. When such
policies are not statutorily clarified, courts should apply the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach within parameters that accord
to the enforcement of such contracts by the clinics or by the donors against the clinics"));
see also J.B. v. M.B. & C.C., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (2001). Thus, the court enforces the
provision of the parties' original contract that provides that the University's obligation to
store the embryos would not extend beyond ten years. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783, n.4.
This aspect of the court's holding may be attributed to its view that the contract with the
University may still be enforceable as between it and the parties, but the scope of the
distinction is left unclear. The scope of this distinction will present difficulty for other
courts that adopt this approach.
142 The court holds that "any expense associated with maintaining the status quo
should logically be borne by the person opposing destruction." Witten, 672 N.W.2d at
783 (citing Coleman, supra note 103, at 112 ("The right to insist on the continued
storage of the embryos should be dependent on a willingness to pay the associated
costs.")).
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with the parameters of the strict contract approach-that is, by allowing
parties to change the intent expressed in their original agreement only when
the original agreement did not contemplate the contingency of divorce.14 3
C. The Balancing Approach
When parties do not have an enforceable agreement regarding the
disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce, courts may opt to balance one
party's right to procreate versus the objecting party's right not to
procreate.'" As with many other aspects of the disposition of frozen
embryos, the policies surrounding the rights and interests of the respective
parties and the constitutional parameters of those rights and interests may be
clarified or reconciled legislatively. It is sufficient to observe that in cases in
which parties have not expressly stated their intent for disposition upon
divorce-or in cases in which the parties have stated their intent upon divorce
but courts or legislatures apply a broad interpretation or policy that allows
143 The court's consideration that it may be "impossible to make a knowing and
intelligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the time the right is to be
exercised," see Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777, and that, therefore, even when parties
mutually consent to disposition upon divorce in an original agreement, they should be
able to unilaterally change their minds, is strictly a matter of public policy. Many states
allow for surrogate mothers and mothers considering adoption to change their minds after
original consent. This-like other conclusions about individual public policies on related
issues-is beyond the scope of this article. However, in the case of agreements regarding
disposition of embryos upon divorce, particularly when legislatures mandate that parties
state their intent so as to facilitate the fair and reasonable application of a strict
contractual approach, such as I propose here, it is particularly incongruous and illogical
to mandate agreements regarding specific contingencies, but to hold such agreements
unenforceable upon a subsequent unilateral change of heart. For discussion of issues
involving the emotional or "regrettable" aspects of reproductive decisions, see generally
Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255 (2011)
(discussing treatment of reproductive regret through developing several models on
variety of disputes, such as abortion, surrogacy, frozen embryos, and unplanned
pregnancy).
144 Susan L. Crockin, Commentary, "What Is an Embryo? ": A Legal Perspective, 36
CONN. L. REv. 1177, 1181-82 (2004) (suggesting an approach that recognizes the
normative property foundations as preferable to the right to be a parent); Jessica Berg, Of
Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 369 (2007); Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to
Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 159, 215-19 (2005); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (embryos are not people).
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for one party to change his or her mind despite a prior agreement
contemplating divorce-the balancing approach affords a workable standard
that allows the court to consider the individual interests of the parties while
safeguarding the autonomous decision-making authority of both parties. As
reasoned by the court in Davis, the balancing approach avoids the limitations
of the application of a bright line rule, 145 but it is more susceptible to
inconsistent and unpredictable application. However, a legislative policy
that mandates that parties express their intent for disposition upon divorce
would limit the need for courts to balance the interests of the parties, thereby
promoting autonomous decision-making by the parties. It would also assure
the predictability and fairness that is universally called for by courts forced
to determine disposition upon divorce when legislative guidance on the
policies relevant to that disposition is lacking.
1. Davis v. Davis146
The landmark case that established the foundational analysis for the status
and disposition of frozen embryos was Davis v. Davis.147 In Davis, Junior
Lewis Davis and Mary Sue Davis were the progenitors of seven frozen
embryos.148 Upon dissolution of the marriage, Mary Sue Davis first sought
to acquire the frozen embryos to implant in her own uterus, to give birth to a
child post-divorce.149 Junior Davis wished for the frozen embryos to be
preserved until he could decide whether he wanted to become a parent
outside of marriage.150 Holding that the embryos were "human beings" from
the moment of fertilization, the trial court awarded custody of the embryos to
Mary Sue Davis.151 The appellate court reversed, holding that Junior Davis
had a "constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no
14' Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
146 Id. at 588.
147 Id. With respect to status, the Davis court held that embryos were neither "persons"
nor property under federal or Tennessee law, but rather occupied an interim category that
entitled them to special respect because of their potential for human life. Id. at 594-97.
148 Id. at 589.
149 Id.
15 Id.
1s1 Id.
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pregnancy has taken place," and that there was "no compelling state interest
to justify . .. ordering implantation against the will of either party."' 5 2 The
court vested the parties with "joint control . . . and equal voice over [the]
disposition [of the embryos].' 53
During the course of litigation, both parties remarried and changed their
respective positions on the disposition of the embryos. Mary Sue no longer
wished to use the embryos to become pregnant; rather, she wanted to donate
the embryos to another couple.1 54  Junior wanted the embryos to be
destroyed.155 Considering their respective positions and the fact that there
was no original agreement as to disposition of the embryos upon divorce, the
court balanced the interests of the parties, finding that Junior's interest in not
procreating outweighed Mary Sue's interests, and the court affirned the
Court of Appeal's judgment favoring Junior's position.'5 6  Junior
subsequently collected the preserved embryos from the Knoxville clinic
where they were preserved and destroyed them.
Under the balancing framework in Davis, the court first acknowledged
that there were two possibilities through which it could resolve the conflict
without balancing the parties' interests: a Tennessee statute governing the
disposition of the embryos, or an agreement between the parties.157 Either
would have been dispositive. However, Tennessee provided no such
statutory or common law guidance on its policy in such matters, and the
152 id
153  d.
154 Id. at 590.
155 id.
156 Id at 604.
'5 Id. at 590. "[A]s a starting point ... an agreement regarding disposition of any
untransferred embryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death of one or more of
the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) should be
presumed valid and should be enforced as between progenitors." Id. at 597.
158 At the time of Davis, the only existing statute was in Louisiana (1986 LA. ACTS R.S.
9:121 et seq.), which forbade the intentional destruction of a cryopreserved IVF embryo
and applied a "best interest of the embryo" standard to party disputes. The statute
provided that unwanted embryos must be made available for "adoptive implantation."
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590, n.1.
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Davises had no written agreement specifying their intent as to disposition of
any unused embryos.159 Thus, the court was forced to construct a workable
framework for resolving the issue.
The court considered several bright line tests offered by commentators on
the subject, 160 including two versions of an implied contract model. 16 1 The
court also noted the "equity models," one of which suggested dividing the
embryos equally between the parties for them to do with as they wished,162
and the other that afforded "veto power" to the party desiring to avoid
parenthood. However, without an express statutory policy adopted by the
legislature, the court reasoned that there were too many factors that come to
bear on the issue for it to adopt a bright line litmus test. Instead, the court
concluded that it must "weigh the interests of each party . . . in order to
resolve [the] dispute in a fair and responsible manner."16 Thus, without an
express agreement between the parties, or a statute directing the court
toward any state policy on the issue, the court balanced the parties'
respective rights of procreational autonomy, i.e., Mary Sue Davis's interest
159 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. The court noted that the Davises never even discussed,
let alone agreed to, contingencies upon divorce. Id. at 592.
160 The court noted comments suggesting options ranging from mandating use or
destruction, id. at 590 (citing Brian J. Hynes, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos:
Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIs. 97 (1990)), to
restricting control to female gamete providers because of greater contribution to the
process (the so-called "sweat-equity" model), id. (citing Robertson, Resolving Disputes
Over Frozen Embryos, Hastings Center Report 7, Nov./Dec. 1989). Another suggested
option would limit such restricted control only to instances in which the female donor
would use the embryos for herself See Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo,
32 LOYOLA L. REv. 357 (1986).
161 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. One model provides for the court to draw an inference
from enrollment in an IVF program that the IVF clinic had authority to determine the
outcome when the parties could not reach agreement, and the other provides for the court
to infer from the parties' creation of the embryos that they irrevocably committed
themselves to reproduction and would require transfer to either the female provider or to
another donee. Id. at 590-91.
162 Id. at 591. The court noted the futility of this alternative in that it would contradict
both of the parties' wishes. See id. at 591, n.6.
163 Id. at 591 (citing Elisa K. Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen
Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67 (1990)).
164 Id.
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in using the embryos versus Junior Davis's interest in not using the
embryos.16 5 In balancing the parties' interests, the court held:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail,
assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of
achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos
in question. If no other reasonable alternative exists, then the
argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy
should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the
embryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the
objectin6 party obviously has the greater interest and should
prevail.
Thus, in Davis, the court held that an original agreement by the parties
would be enforceable.' 67 Compared to the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach, although the outcomes may differ depending on the facts of the
case and the applicability of state policies, i.e., whether the original
agreement contemplated divorce and whether such agreements are
enforceable, the frameworks are consistent. The difference between Davis
and Witten is that upon disagreement, the Davis court found it appropriate to
balance the interests of the parties and did so in favor of the interest in not
procreating, thereby allowing the embryos to be destroyed. Whereas in
Witten, public policy superseded the court's balancing of the parties'
interests.169 To this extent, the balancing approach in Davis may be favored
over the contemporaneous mutual consent approach in Witten because the
balancing approach allows for the consideration of the independent interests
of both parties when a state's public policy on this issue is not expressed or
is otherwise contrary on the issue of the enforceability of such contracts.170
165 Id. at 604.
1 Id.
167 Id. at 597.
161 Id. at 603-04.
9 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779-80.
170 For comment on the application of default rules with specific critique of Witten, see
Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procreational Autonomy Through the Utilization of Default
Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals An Indefinite
Solution, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1365, 1373-74, 1386-88 (2008) (concluding that by
mandating an outcome, the holding in Witten fails to maintain the procreational freedom
of both parents).
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Nevertheless, with respect to the right to change one's mind within these
frameworks, neither court expressly defined the appropriate parameter of
that right by limiting it to agreements in which the parties have not already
contemplated the contingency of divorce.
2. J.B.v.M.B&C.C'
Almost ten years after Davis, the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied a
similar balancing test and reached a similar result in JB. v. M.B & CC.172
In J.B., the husband and wife initiated IVF procedures, which resulted in
seven embryos remaining in storage.173 The clinic's consent form addressed
the control and disposition of remaining embryos and included an agreement
signed by both parties which provided that upon dissolution of the marriage,
unless the court orders otherwise, all control, direction, and ownership of the
embryos would be relinquished to the IVF Program.' 74 Within their claim
for divorce, the husband stated his desire for the embryos to be donated, and
the wife objected. However, the court determined that the basis for the
agreement between the parties to engage in the IVF process-to create a
family as a married couple-no longer existed. With the agreement
ambiguous as to which party would control the use of the embryos upon the
contingency of divorce, as in Davis, the court held that there was no clear
indication of the parties' intent. 175 The court held that "[w]ithout guidance
from the Legislature, we must consider a means by which courts can engage
in a principled review of the issues presented in such cases in order to
achieve a just result."1 7 6 For the court in JB., the means by which to
achieve a just result was to balance the interests of the parties. As in Davis,
the court held that the right not to become a parent outweighed the right to
"' J.B. v. M.B, 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
172 Id. In J.B., however, it was the wife (J.B.) who wanted to destroy the frozen
embryos and the husband (M.B.) who wanted to preserve them, to be used by donating
them to another couple.
. Id. at 708.
174 Id. at 709-10.
171 Id. at 713.
116 Id. at 715.
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use the embryos to become a parent, and, therefore, the embryos were not
implanted.'"
In reaching its conclusion, the court in JB. acknowledged that there are
benefits to enforcing contracts, as expressed in Kass and Davis, and
recognized that "in vitro fertilization is in widespread use, and that there is a
need for agreements between the participants and the clinics that perform the
procedures."l 78 The court noted:
Advances in medical technology have far outstripped the
development of legal principles to resolve the inevitable disputes
arising out of the new reproductive opportunities now available...
. Yet, at the point when a husband and wife decide to begin the in
vitro fertilization process, they are unlikely to anticipate divorce or
to be concerned about the disposition of pre-embryos on
divorce. 79
In light of these dynamics, the court held:
We believe that the better rule, and the one we adopt, is to enforce
agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is begun,
subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
[]embryos. 80
As in A.Z v. B.Z., the parameters of this holding should be limited to
agreements in which the parties did not contemplate divorce in their original
agreement. If they had, the original agreement should be enforced.' 8 ' Upon
a party's change of mind, the interests of both parties must be evaluated and,
under the analysis in J.B., the party choosing not to become a biological
parent will ordinarily prevail.182 In considering the respective interests of
the parties, specifically the fact that the husband, M.B., was already a father
"n J.B., 783 A.2d at 716-17.
8 Id. at 719.
17 1 Id. at 715.
1"s Id. at 719.
181 "[D]espite the conditional nature of the disposition provisions, in the large majority
of cases the agreements will control, permitting fertility clinics and other like facilities to
rely on their terms." Id.
182 id.
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and was capable of fathering other children, the court affirmed the right of
the wife, J.B., to prevent implantation of the embryos.1
The court concluded by adding that "[w]e express no opinion in respect of
a case in which a party who has become infertile seeks use of stored
preembryos against the wishes of his or her partner, noting only that the
possibility of adoption also may be a consideration, among others, in the
court's assessment."' 84 This caveat would come to bear in 2012, in Reber v.
Reiss, which was the first case to address the issue of the disposition of
frozen preembryos upon divorce in such a context and, thereby, complete the
framework of possibilities first presented in Davis two decades before.
3. Reber v. Reiss 85
In 2012, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania confronted the scenario in
which the party seeking to preserve the embryos was a wife who was unable
to procreate biologically after having undergone chemotherapy for breast
cancer, and the parties had no agreement regarding the disposition of the
frozen embryos.' 86 The trial court awarded thirteen frozen embryos to the
wife in the parties' divorce decree.' 87
A Special Master first recommended that the embryos be awarded to the
husband, who would direct that the embryos be destroyed. After trial, the
court concluded that ordinarily, in balancing the parties' interests, the party
"8 J.B., 783 A.2d at 719-20.
184 Id. at 720. The court noted that, in balancing these interests, adoption may be a
relevant issue as to availability to become a parent. Id. (Verniero, concurring).
Concurring Judge Zazzali, discussing adoption, infertile couples, and advancing
technology, noted: "[D]eveloping technologies will give rise to many more such
controversies in the future. The resolution of those controversies depends on the amount
of caution, compassion and common sense we summon up as we balance the competing
interests. The significance of those interests underscores the need for continued careful
and deliberate decision-making, infused with equity, in this developing jurisprudence."
Id.
185 Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
" Id. at 1132-33.
"8 Id. at 1134.
' Id. at 1133.
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wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.189  However, the court
concluded that the wife's inability to achieve biological parenthood without
the use of the embryos was a unique factor that outweighed the husband's
desire to avoid procreation.190 The trial court awarded the embryos to the
wife as part of the equitable distribution of property, and the husband
appealed.19'
The court held that, under these circumstances, the balancing approach
was the most suitable test.' 92 Unlike the court in Witten, the Reber court
disagreed with the husband's argument that the "court should have enforced
a provision in the consent form that the []embryos would be destroyed after
three years," finding that such a provision related to the parameters of
storage rather than an agreement about disposition.' 93 Thus, in the absence
of the parties-or the legislature-offering a formula regarding disposition,
the court opted to balance the parties' interests.194 In considering the wife's
interest in procreating, the court determined that this was the 44-year-old
wife's last chance to have a genetically related child. The embryos were
created so that she could conceive after her cancer treatment was completed.
Most notably, the court concluded that, "unless and until our legislature
decides to tackle this issue, our courts must consider the individual
circumstances of each case."' 95  Based on the unique circumstances
presented in Reber, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
awarded the embryos to the wife.196 Thus, the full range of factual
189 Id. at 1134.
190 Id.
9' Id at 1134.
192 id.
'
93 Id at 1136.
194 Id. at 1134.
19' Id. at 1142, n.I1 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17(2) (West 2012)) ("Absent a written
agreement, decision making authority regarding the disposition of pre [-]embryos shall
reside jointly with the commissioning couple."); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.706(b)
(Vernon 2011) ("The consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be
withdrawn by that individual in a record kept by a licensed physician at any time before
the placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos.").
196 Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142.
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possibilities within the Davis balancing framework was now presented
within Reber. However, because the parties in Reber had no original
agreement providing for their intent for disposition upon the contingency of
divorce, the parameters for the right of a party to change his or her mind
remained unresolved.
Likewise, in a case similar to Reber reported in January 2013, the
Maryland Circuit Court considered the disposition of nine frozen embryos
claimed by Honorine Anong, despite the objection of her former husband,
Godlove Mbah.19 7  The parties began IVF procedures in 2008, through
which they gave birth to a daughter. However, following their divorce in
May 2012, they continued to dispute the disposition of the remaining
embryos.'98  Originally, the parties had an agreement providing that the
embryos would be given to the wife in the case of a separation.19 9 Upon
their divorce, however, the husband wished for the embryos to be
200destroyed. Similar to the case in Reber, the wife contended that because
her fallopian tubes were removed in the previous IVF procedure to help her
conceive, she could not have children without using those embryos. 2 0 1 On
this basis, the court awarded sole custody of the embryos to the wife.
Similar to Reber, therefore, the outcome begs the unresolved question of
whether the court would have held similarly-allowing the husband to
change his mind-if the parties had formed an original agreement that
contemplated the contingency of divorce202 and if this were not the wife's
197 See Bailey Henneberg, Maryland Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos,
GREENBELT PATCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://greenbelt.patch.com/articles/judge-awards-
maryland-woman-custody-of-frozen-embryos?national=patch&ncid=edlinkuspatc0000
0006 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (describing case in which court gave nine frozen embryos
to ex-wife over ex-husband's objection).
198 The husband was awarded sole custody of the existing daughter after it was
determined that the mother was unfit to have custody of the child. Id. This raises a
variety of questions as to the application of any relevant custody or fitness standards to
the existing embryos, which would be dependent upon the status prescribed to the
embryos.
199 Id
200 id.
201 id.
202 This also assumes that, with respect to the language providing for disposition upon
the contingency of separation, the court would interpret such language narrowly, as the
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only means of becoming a genetic parent. Nevertheless, the limitation for
resolution is not in the failure of the legal frameworks originally prescribed
by Davis. Rather, it is the result of imprecise legislative policies on the issue
of embryo disposition upon divorce. The Davis framework merely provides
a workable continuum for resolution in its stead.
D. A Workable Continuum
Since 1992, in determining the disposition of frozen embryos upon
divorce, courts have opted for one of the three approaches discussed in this
203Article. Each approach has its inherent benefits and shortcomings. A
strict contract approach is narrow, as there is less opportunity for parties to
make autonomous decisions upon contingencies not provided for in the
agreement, e.g., divorce. However, when parties do express their intent for
disposition upon divorce, a strict contract approach is advantageous in that it
provides predictability and assures autonomous decision-making. A
legislative policy mandating such agreements may guarantee that decisions
regarding disposition upon divorce would rest with the progenitors.
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach, while flexible in
providing individual parties the opportunity to change his or her mind upon
the contingency of divorce, may lack the predictability and enforceability of
the contractual approach if parameters for changing one's mind are not
clearly defined. For example, a couple may agree that the embryos will be
destroyed upon divorce. Thus, either party may have based his or her
decision to participate in the IVF process on the understanding that, should
the couple face divorce, the embryos would not be used. The objecting
party may not have consented to participate otherwise. However, if a party
court did in A.Z. v. B.Z, see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000)
(interpreting consent form providing for disposition upon separation as not inclusive of
contingency of divorce), rather than broadly, as the court did in Witten, see In re
Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (interpreting the disposition provision
regarding death during marriage broadly enough to encompass decision-making protocol
upon divorce), and Litowitz, see In re Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270-71 (Wash. 2002)
(interpreting broadly provision of contract addressing disagreement between parties to
include disagreement even upon divorce).
203 Commentators have offered other frameworks for resolution outside of the scope of
judicial determination. See, e.g., Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical
Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial
Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 395, 411-16 (2005) (arguing for alternative dispute
resolution to resolve frozen embryo disputes).
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may change his or her mind after the parties have already contemplated and
agreed to disposition upon divorce, it may defeat the reliance that the other
party placed on the original agreement.
Although the balancing approach is effective in implementing public
policy considerations regarding parenthood and individual party interests, it
also requires burdensome litigation. Additionally, it is most susceptible to
inconsistency and unpredictability. Perhaps most importantly, it is the least
conducive to autonomous decision-making by the parties. However,
mandating that parties unambiguously express their intent upon divorce
under a narrowly defined contractual approach would avoid the need for
courts to balance the interests of the parties.
As evidenced by the court opinions discussed herein, state legislatures can
reconcile the inherent drawbacks of each framework by first mandating that
all agreements between parties and IVF providers include provisions that
expressly provide for disposition upon divorce. 204  In addition, state
legislatures should statutorily provide for public policy presumptions upon
the failure of parties to unambiguously provide for disposition upon divorce,
or upon subsequent disagreement. By doing so, states will maximize the
informed autonomous decision-making by parties that, when lacking,
typically prompts litigation. When litigation does result, however, the legal
frameworks set out in Davis provide a workable continuum by which courts
may fairly dispose of frozen embryos upon divorce. Courts may enforce the
original agreements of parties when such agreements expressly provide for
the unambiguous intent of the parties for disposition upon divorce, and may
allow for parties to express a new intent by contemporaneously and mutually
consenting to disposition upon the occurrence of a contingency not
205previously contemplated. Upon disagreement, courts may balance the
204 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (expressing the need for legislatures to mandate binding agreements
expressing the parties' specific intentions upon foreseeable changes in circumstances);
Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 271 (Chambers, concurring) (recognizing that public policy
principles must factor into dissolution proceedings involving frozen embryos); Roman,
193 S.W.3d at 44 (anticipating legislative resolution of the issue); In re Marriage of
Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (attempting to identify state policy
providing for default rule); AZ., 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (recognizing public policy favoring
autonomous decision-making); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992)
(recognizing legislative directive as dispositive on issue of disposition); J.B. v. M.B. &
C.C., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001) (urging legislative guidance to achieve just result).
205 JB., 783 A.2d at 718-19 (citing Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (noting "need for clear,
consistent principles to guide parties in protecting their interests and resolving their
disputes.")). Kass supported the enforcement of contracts because they "avoid costly
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interests of the parties, and may do so more effectively and predictably when
guided by the public policy determinations of the state rather than individual
courts. Thus, with a workable continuum in place, and the opportunity to
more narrowly define the parameters within which a party may change his or
her mind yet to present itself, courts simply await legislative guidance for a
more efficient, affordable, and predictable resolution.
II. LEGISLATIVE POSTURING
It is evident that many law-making bodies are poised to address various
issues and policies involving frozen embryos. Some state legislatures may
designate or limit specific uses of embryos through state statutes,206 many of
which involve regulations of abortion or embryonic research.207 Some states
litigation," and "both minimize misunderstandings and maximizes procreative liberty by
reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a
quintessentially personal private decision." Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; see also Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 597; John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements For Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 409-18 (1990) (arguing that enforcement of advance
directives maximizes reproductive freedom, minimizes disputes, and provides certainty to
couples and in vitro fertilization programs).
206 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 2012) (prohibiting use for any purpose
other than that indicated by provider's written consent form).
207 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, § 1593 (West 2004) (prohibiting use,
transfer, or distribution of in utero and ex utero fetuses for experimentation); MASS ANN.
LAWS CH. 112, § 12J (I)-(III) (West 2004) (prohibiting research on fetus, defined to
include embryos); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2004) (prohibiting non-
therapeutic research on embryos); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-.2691 (West 2003)
(providing for various offenses against unborn children, defined to be "the unborn
offspring of a human conceived, but not yet born"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421, 422
(West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting research on living human conceptus, defined to
include human organism from fertilization through first 265 days thereafter); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, -3, -5 (Michie 2003) (prohibiting research on fetus, defined as product
of conception); N.D. CENT CODE 14-02.2-01 (2004) (prohibiting research on fetus
"before or after expulsion from its mother's womb"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203,
3216 (West 2000) (prohibiting non-therapeutic research on unborn child, defined as
human from fertilization until live birth); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (2002) (prohibiting
research on live fetus, defined to include embryo); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-14-16 to -
20 (Mich. 2004) (prohibiting research on embryo, defined to include in vitro embryos
from single-celled stage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (2012) (prohibiting research on
live unborn children); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting
destruction of unborn child, defined as human being from conception until live birth).
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208
specifically prohibit the destruction of embryos, while others might
specifically require parties to donate their embryos.209 In some cases, states
do not require specific dispositions but, instead, simply limit the amount of
time that embryos may remain unfrozen or stored.210
Only a few states have addressed specific aspects involving divorce, and
of these, most address the issue of parentage rather than disposition.211
208 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1.2 (West 2002) (prohibiting killing any
unborn child, defined as an "individual of the human species from fertilization until
birth"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266 et seq (2012) (providing for various offenses
against unborn children, defined to be "the unborn offspring of a human conceived, but
not yet bom"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (2011) (requiring that embryos be
transferred to woman to avoid clinical experimentation restrictions); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.04 (2011) (prohibiting destruction of unborn child, defined as human being from
conception until live birth). But see KAN. STAT. § 65-6702 (2012) (permitting
destruction of product of in vitro fertilization prior to implantation).
209 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2012) (requiring adoptive implantation upon
renunciation by parents, in accordance with written procedures of facility where embryos
are stored).
210 See, e.g., N.H. STAT. 168-B:15 (2013) (limiting ex utero noncryopreserved state to
14 days post-fertilization).
211 See Unif. Parent. Act, § 706, providing: "(a) If a marriage is dissolved before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to
occur after a divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child. (b) The consent
of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual in a
record at any time before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos." Unif. Parentage Act §
706. Several states adopt the parentage rules of § 706. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-
4-106(7)(b) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, §§ 8-101 to 102, 8-701 to 8-707 (2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-64 (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (Vernon 2011);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.725 (West 2011); WYo. STAT. ANN §§ 14-2-401 et seq.
(2012); see also Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (2011) (defining parental rights for
embryo donation); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10, § 551 - 556 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
158(3)(C) (2012) (addressing parentage upon divorce). The Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology provides similar language. See ABA Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology § 606 (Effect of Dissolution of Marriage
or Withdrawal of Consent). For discussion of the distinction between the Uniform
Parentage Act and the Uniform Probate Code with respect to assisted reproduction, see
Kristine S. Knaplund, Children ofAssisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 899
(2012).
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Although some states statutorily require that physicians provide forms
discussing possible dispositions of embryos to promote informed consent,212
only Florida requires a written agreement providing for disposition upon
divorce. 213
Despite states' efforts to provide statutorily for policy issues involving
frozen embryos, courts dealing with the issue of divorce have clearly and
unanimously urged legislatures to provide guidance on policies affecting
disposition under such circumstances. Although individual policies may
vary, courts clearly prefer that parties exercise informed decision-making
rather than courts applying a balancing approach. To the extent that state
legislatures can promote this decision-making policy, they should do so.
III. RECOMMENDATION
State legislatures should mandate that parties participating in assisted
reproductive technologies expressly provide for the disposition of genetic
material upon divorce. While scholars may disagree as to the effectiveness
of any particular mechanism by which parties indicate their intent,214 the
practical necessity of such a mandate is undeniable. Still, many scholars
question the practicality of requiring couples in the throes of infertility to
make decisions about the disposition of embryos upon divorce.21 Within
212 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 19a-32d through 32g (2010); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 L, § 4 (West 2012); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West 2012).
213 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17, providing: "A commissioning couple and the
treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of
the commissioning couple's eggs, sperm, and preembryos in the event of a divorce, the
death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance. (1) Absent a written agreement,
any remaining eggs or sperm shall remain under the control of the party that provides the
eggs or sperm. (2) Absent a written agreement, decision making authority regarding the
disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the commissioning couple." See also
Brenda L. Henderson, Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital
Dissolution Under Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REv. 549 (1992).
214 See Forman, supra note 12, at 57 (urging courts and legislatures not to enforce
embryo disposition divorce provisions found in clinic consent forms).
215 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003). See also Brandon J. Bankowski, The Social
Implications of Embryo Cryospreservation, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 4, 823, 828 (Oct.
2005).
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other areas involving reproduction and parenthood, such as those involving
adoption and surrogacy agreements, policy demands that a party be afforded
the opportunity to change his or her mind.21 6 Although the difficulty of such
personal and emotional decisions should not be minimized, the right to
change one's mind should not be absolute or unqualified, particularly when
other parties have relied on the original agreement of the party now
changing his or her mind. Furthermore, the decision to participate in IVF
procedures is an equally emotional decision. It is incongruous, at the least,
to hold that a party is capable of making the autonomous decision to
undergo IVF procedures, with all of the risks and consequences inherent in
such procedures, and to decide on the disposition of embryos upon a variety
of circumstances and contingencies, but to be unable to determine one's
intent for disposition upon divorce. More so, to rest such incongruous
reasoning on the argument that such decisions ought not to be dependent on
the foresight of creative lawyering or the drafting of precise contractual
language that expresses the unambiguous intent of the parties is contrary to
accepted policies that validate and enforce nuptial agreements, in which
divorcing parties routinely express their intent on issues of child custody and
property distribution.
Indeed, every court addressing the issue, regardless of the legal
framework for which that court has opted, has universally acknowledged
that the parties' agreed-upon intent-however formed-may be determinative
of disposition.217 Thus, a narrowly drawn contractual framework may be
sufficient under such circumstances. It is only when divorcing parties fail to
expressly provide for disposition upon divorce that a balancing of interests
may be the more appropriate-but less preferred-framework, and other
policies regarding the status of the embryos may come to bear. Whatever
the default policy may be, it necessarily provides predictability for the
progenitors and the fertility clinics, and, therefore, promotes decision-
making autonomy to parties who agree to participate in the assisted
reproductive process.
216 See Falker, supra note 7, at 523 (viewing reproductive contracts under the adoption
paradigm as inapplicable to disposition cases). See also In re Baby, No. M2012-01040-
COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 245039 at *1 (Tenn. App. Jan. 22, 2013) (denying surrogate
mother's request to invalidate order ratifying surrogacy agreement).
217 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 156-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (enforcing
parties' original contract); Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 782 (recognizing enforceability of in
vitro fertilization contracts, subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind)
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (holding embryo disposition agreements between progenitors
to be presumptively valid and enforceable) .
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Where states do not implement such a requirement, courts confronting the
disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce should more narrowly define the
frameworks for legal analysis derived from Davis. Specifically, courts
should adhere to the strict contract model in cases in which the parties have
expressly and unambiguously stated in an original consent agreement their
intent with respect to disposition upon divorce. One party should not be
allowed to unilaterally alter that agreement, reached by mutual reliance, by
simply changing his or her mind upon a contingency that the parties already
contemplated. In cases in which couples have no such original agreement,
or in cases in which they have an agreement for disposition but it does not
unambiguously express their intent for disposition upon divorce, the court
should allow a party to determine his or her intent upon the contingency of
divorce and provide for contemporaneous mutual consent to resolve
disposition. Only upon the absence of an original agreement, or conflict
between the parties as a result of the contingency of a divorce that was not
contemplated in the original agreement, should the court balance the parties'
interests to determine disposition.
CONCLUSION
The legal frameworks for determining the disposition of frozen embryos
upon divorce, first established in 1992 in Davis v. Davis, have provided a
continuum of reasoning that has allowed courts addressing the issue to
218
consider the unique circumstances of individual cases. Within any
individual case, the Davis court recognized two controlling factors to govern
disposition: the written agreement of the parties and the legislative policies
of the state.219
Universally, in making such determinations, courts favor the contractual
intent of the progenitors over the balancing of individual interests by the
court.
Many states have statutorily provided policies that govern specific issues
relevant to the court's consideration of the respective interests of the parties-
parentage provisions, limitations on use, personhood status, and inheritance
restrictions all dictate the interests that courts may favor in a variety of
circumstances. But there are very few statutory provisions that promote or
encourage the policies governing dispositional decision-making authority
specific to the contingency of divorce. The Davis case-and each case
218 See supra text accompanying notes 20-202.
219 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
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discussed in this Article relevant to divorce-is merely the product of this
lack of legislative direction.
The analysis provided in Davis accommodates two legal objectives-the
enforceability of contracts and the balancing of individual interests.220 The
applicability of each depends on the scope of the parties' intent with respect
to the disposition of their embryos. When intent is unambiguous, courts
enforce contracts. When intent is lacking or conflicted, courts balance
interests. When courts balance interests, legislative policy dictates
preferences. Analytically, this presents a consistent and seamless framework
for resolution. But when the contingency of divorce is introduced to the
equation, with no specific policies to guide determinations of decision-
making authority or disposition, parties tend to change their minds, and
resolution becomes more difficult.
Absent legislative policy on the specific issue of the disposition of frozen
embryos upon divorce, the Davis framework provides for parties to change
their minds upon the contingency of divorce by recognizing a
contemporaneous mutual consent approach to resolving dispositions.
However, as applied in practice, a broad interpretation of the Davis
framework may blur the parameters of this approach by allowing parties to
change their minds subsequent to an original agreement. Where parties have
already contemplated divorce as a contingency and have agreed upon
disposition, such agreements should be enforced. Thus, contemporaneous
mutual consent should only apply in cases in which parties have not yet
contemplated and agreed to disposition upon divorce. If parties do not
contemporaneously mutually agree upon such contingency, then courts
should balance the respective interests. By narrowly drawing the parameters
for when parties may change their minds, and by limiting unambiguous
intent to the circumstances in which the parties find themselves, the Davis
framework may continue to provide a consistent, predictable, and
responsible method for resolving embryo disposition upon divorce. By
adopting a legislative policy mandating that parties express their
unambiguous intent for disposition upon divorce, such that courts may
enforce contracts and avoid the balancing of constitutional interests, states
may maximize autonomous decision-making, minimize litigation, and afford
courts and infertile couples the consistent and predictable resolution for
disposition that each deserves.
220 See id. at 596-97, 603-04.
